

décor but because they are difficult and attractive works, and because at Kassel they were hung spaciouly and in quantity.

One of the last propositions of the book is that not until the 1960s, and as a consequence of Kassel, did there develop an exhibition culture dominated by temporary displays 'in which the curator is the greatest hero of the show' (p. 174) and that from that time onwards modernist exhibitions became 'for more and more people a leisure activity with independent entertainment value' (p. 184), as if that could not be said at Trafalgar Square in the 1840s or at Somerset House in the 1780s. In Klonk's history, Harald Szeemann's trend-defining *Documenta 5* of 1972 that established conceptual art as a 'turn' against commodification is given short shrift (seven lines), while other exhibitions urging a direct revision in the spectator's posture and mode of gratification receive little or none. For it is significant that the radical stripping away of sensuous gratification, mystical adoration, or meandering reverie that became the shared preoccupation of a generation of younger artists from the later 1960s onwards was engineered by works in combination with the spaces they were shown in (or not shown in, *vide* land art and happenings). Since several of these epochal exhibitions were staged in London, (*This is Tomorrow*, 1956, or *When Attitudes Become Form*, 1969) it seems appropriate to complain.

Klonk's final view, in a book packed with intensive garnering of largely secondary material, is that the alleged post-war paradigm of the 'spectator as consumer' has persisted until today, borne upwards by a flood of art tourists who circulate around the newest curatorial experiments sampling one bland installation-type event after another. By now her tone has become sneering and despairing. Blandness, as she puts it, afflicts contemporary art museums across the world insofar as more-or-less neutral white-box spaces still abound. Recent works such as Eliasson's *Weather Project* are written off as out-of-body experiences akin to drug-related euphorias. One comes to 'the end of the museum age' (p. 213) with a sense that nothing more optimistic can be extracted from recent exhibition culture than yet another pseudo-visit to the pseudo-shops, another exercise in self-styling.

Actually, the early *Documenta* shows are the last for which Klonk feels any special resonance or sympathy. Gropius and Moholy-Nagy in the late 1920s provide an earlier mode of exhibition design in which images rationally disposed encouraged viewers to assess things 'from different sides', as Adolf Behn wrote of the AHAG building firm exhibition in Berlin in 1929 (p. 222). Even before that, the trio of *Demonstrationsräume* devised by Lissitzky in Berlin (1923), Dresden (1926), and Hanover (1928) as alternatives to the 'drawing room' style, as he called it, provide another model. In the latter, Lissitzky stipulated wall surfaces that would change tonally with the viewer's movement and arranged hanging screens that could be moved manually. And yet to say that these rooms 'represented an effort to create a collective experience out

of the interaction of individuals' or that the Hanover exhibition room provided 'experience of what it would be like to act as a collective subject in a post-capitalist society' (p. 118) goes well beyond the data we have about how the room was actually used. And then finally, Klonk champions the form of exhibition mobilised at *Documenta 12* in 2007, in which the intention was once more to create dialogic communities, not as transcendent of a supposedly fractured society but in active relationship to it. I do not think we can be sure how many of Lissitzky's visitors engaged in dialogue, or how good the dialogue really was in Kassel – and yet thoroughly de-individualising the viewer's experience remains the great hope of this reforming project for art. What Klonk derides as 'private contemplation' will disappear in this unappealing future, when the art object as a stimulus for wonder and fascination will finally have had its day.

Notes

1. For this and other London art museums in the nineteenth century and later, the reader may consult my *Art for the Nation: Exhibitions and the London Public* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).
2. Janet Ward, *Weimar Surfaces: Urban Visual Culture in Weimar Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), and Helmut Lethen, *Cool Conduct: The Culture of Distance in Weimar Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

doi:10.1093/oxartj/kcq020

Photography and Mindedness

Alex Vasudevan

Michael Fried, *Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before* (Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2008), 90 b&w illns, 70 colour plates, 410 pp., colour, hardback ISBN 9780300136845, £30.

My argument against the set-up picture is that it leaves the matter of content to the IMAGINATION of the photographer, a faculty that, in my experience, is generally deficient compared to the mad swirling possibilities that our dear common world kicks up at us on a regular basis. That's all.
(Tod Papageorge in interview with Alec Soth)¹

'What vanity is painting', wrote Blaise Pascal. 'It wins applause by the mere representation of things, the originals of which are not in the least admired' [*Quelle vanité que la peinture qui attire l'admiration par la ressemblance des choses, dont on n'admire point les originaux!*].² For Pascal, painting possesses the power to attract viewers by virtue of its 'resemblance to the real' while the very object that the painting resembles is unable to 'capture its audience in the same way'. It solicits neither admiration nor judgement even if Pascal places particular weight on the concrete and the real in questions of morality.³ Pascal's antipathy to painting is, of course, well known and one can only speculate as to

what he might have made of contemporary art photography. Pertinent perhaps here is another philosophical text written almost 300 years later, a short and similarly terse text by Ludwig Wittgenstein from his notebooks for the *Tractatus*:

The work of art is the object [*Gegenstand*] seen *sub specie aeternitatis*; and the good life is the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is the connection between art and ethics. The common way of looking at things sees objects as it were from out of their midst, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside. Such that they have the whole world as background. Is it perhaps this – that it sees the object [*das Ding*] with space and time instead of *in* space and time [*mit Raum und Zeit statt in Raum un Zeit?*].⁴

These reflections would later appear near the end of the *Tractatus* in slightly reworked form. There Wittgenstein writes that to ‘view the world *sub specie aeternitatis* is to view it as a whole. . . . Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical!’⁵

On first inspection, there would seem to be little to link Pascal’s metaphysical ruminations with Wittgenstein’s austere propositions on the nature of the artwork and its ability to compel us to see it ‘in the right perspective’.⁶ And yet, the very question of *perspective* is central to another of Pascal’s *pensées* where he reflects on the difficulties of securing a critical point of purchase from which to judge the real: ‘In the same way with pictures seen from too far or too near. There is only one indivisible point which is the true place. The others are too near, too far, too high, or too low. Perspective assigns that point in the art of painting, but in truth and morality, who will assign it?’ [*La perspective l’assigne dans l’art de la peinture, mais dans la vérité et dans la morale qui l’assignera?*].⁷

As Louis Marin has suggested, Pascal’s difficulty of finding a fixed point of orientation in questions of truth and morality points to a failure of representation.⁸ Wittgenstein, in contrast, reverses the very terms of Pascal’s much earlier thought experiment. For Wittgenstein, it is indeed the work of art as the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis* that makes the real – not merely its resemblance – *available* for aesthetic contemplation (the ‘connection between art and ethics’). Wittgenstein would add a later gloss writing in 1930 that ‘it seems to me too that besides the work of the artist there is another through which the world may be captured *sub specie aeterni*. It is – as I believe – the way of thought which as it were flies above the world and leaves it the way it is, contemplating it from above in its flight’ [*sie von oben im Fluge betrachtend*].⁹

These are remarkable even startling observations and, if we believe the art historian Michael Fried, they represent ‘arguably Wittgenstein’s most original and sustained contribution to aesthetic thought’ though, as Fried goes on to suggest, ‘it may be only now, in the wake of developments in photography since the late 1970s, that it can be taken in that way’.¹⁰ This is, not surprisingly perhaps, a key proposition at the heart of Fried’s new book

on advanced photographic practice, *Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before*. ‘Philosophical texts by Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Hegel (also by Stanley Cavell and Robert Pippin) are vital to my project’, he writes. ‘This is because’, he adds, ‘the new art photography has found itself compelled to do a certain amount of what I think of as ontological work, and because the writings of those particular philosophers have proved indispensable to my efforts to make clear exactly what this has involved’ (4).

What this has involved is an ambitious (and indeed problematic) reading of contemporary art photography as a ‘new order of artistic practices’ (346). For Fried,

One of the most important developments in the so-called visual arts of the past twenty-plus years has been the emergence of the large-scale, tableau-sized photographs that by virtue of their size demand to be hung on gallery walls in the manner of easel paintings and, in other respects as well, aspire to what might loosely be called the rhetorical, or beholder-addressing significance of paintings while at the same time declaring their artefactual identity as photographs (37).

Fried’s own avatars, in this respect, include photographers such as Bernd and Hilla Becher, Thomas Demand, Andreas Gursky, Thomas Ruff, Cindy Sherman, Thomas Struth, Hiroshi Sugimoto, and Jeff Wall. If these artists belong to a single photographic regime which is to say a shared structure of concerns and representational strategies, Fried is also at pains to highlight the philosophical imperatives at stake here. The particular bodies of work meticulously explored by Fried do not serve as a simple touchstone for philosophical thought, but, in his own words, ‘make a positive contribution to such thought’ (347; emphasis added).

In the case of Fried, this is very much a redemptive project. If we believe Fried, many of the practitioners of the new art photography may, in fact, be seen to offer a reinterpretation or renewal of the *ontological* aims of certain high modernist painting and sculpture. Fried’s longstanding interest in charting the ‘foundations of our imagination of pictorial modernism’ is well known and dates back at the very least to the late 1960s and a series of important articles on minimalist sculpture, most notably ‘Art and Objecthood’.¹¹ If Fried impugned what he understood to be the *literalist* imperatives of minimalism, the historical heart of his wider project centred on a brilliant and meticulous reappraisal of modern French painting from the early eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century, from, in other words, the time of Chardin and Greuze through to Courbet and Manet. The ‘normative terms’ at issue here remain the title terms of Fried’s first book on the topic, themselves inspired by Denis Diderot writing in the 1750s and 1760s on theatre and painting: *absorption* and *theatricality*.¹² As Fried explains and it is worth quoting in full:

A central current or tradition in French painting from Jean-Baptiste Greuze’s momentous Salon debut in 1755 to the

advent of Manet and his generation around 1860 can be understood in terms of an ongoing effort to make paintings that by one strategy or another appear – in the first place by depicting personages wholly *absorbed* in what they are doing, thinking and feeling and in multifigure paintings by binding those figures together in a single, unified composition – to deny the presence before them of the beholder or, to put this more affirmatively, to establish the ontological fiction that the beholder does not exist. Only if this was accomplished could the actual beholder be stopped and held before the canvas; conversely, the least sense on the beholder's part that the depicted personages were acting or, even worse, posing for him [*sic*] was registered as *theatrical* in the pejorative sense of the term, and the painting was judged a failure (40).

According to Fried, contemporary photography has simply inherited the same basic problematic of beholding that featured so prominently in his earlier work. If *Why Photography Matters as Art* is an attempt to account for the 'deep imperatives' that are central to a particular body of art photography, these are 'imperatives' calibrated to a revived 'version of the Diderotian regime or dispensation'.¹³

There is more than a whiff of Hegelian *Aufhebung* at work here, especially in the way that the defining terms of Fried's earlier work have returned 'dialectically' to the 'very centre of advanced photographic practice' (2). Fried famously counterposed the 'theatricality' of minimalist sculpture with modernist works that were anti-theatrical and 'took no notice of the beholder, who was left to come to terms with them [...] as best as he or she could' (270). Contemporary practice, in Fried's view, has served to further denigrate the anti-theatrical and it is only with the appearance of tableau-format photography that this situation has been overcome and redeemed. Fried's principle claim centres on the nature of this sublation. He argues that such photography is characterised by a tension between its status as a distinct image (which takes no notice of its beholder) and a certain 'to-be-seeness' (its mode of addressing its audience). As Fried makes clear: 'The new art photography seeks to come to grips with the issue of beholding in ways that do not succumb to theatricality but which at the same time register the epochality of minimalism/literalism's intervention by an acknowledgment of to-be-seeness' (43). This is a contentious claim not least because of the way in which Fried commits himself to an 'account of photographic art that is anti-theatrical and self-conscious of its "to-be-seeness"'.¹⁴ If this is ultimately an uncomfortable and even unsatisfactory combination, its persuasiveness rests on three basic lines of argument:

1. Recalling the work of Jean-François Chevrier, Fried accords privileged status to the photographic tableau as an 'exemplary instance of resurgent modernism in photographic art'.¹⁵ The tableau becomes the *guarantor* of an anti-theatrical relationship between the photograph and the beholder.
2. If, as Andrew Fisher suggests, Fried's claim on advanced photographic practice rests on the significance of the

photographic tableau, this is an argument that re-establishes an *evaluative* distinction between 'good' and 'bad' objecthood, the first term understood by Fried as pertaining to 'objects that can only be revealed or manifested in and by the art of photography'.¹⁶ Fried's argument hinges therefore on the ability of photography to sidestep the kind of generic minimalist objecthood that was the source of Fried's critique in 'Art and Objecthood'. Not only can this be seen as a necessary concession to the indexicality of photographs which is to say the relationship between a photograph's subject and the photograph itself but is in turn a further acknowledgement of the *artefactual* 'to-be-seeness' of the tableau itself. Only in this way is the ontological risk of photography's defining objecthood neutralised and transformed into a work of art.¹⁷

3. Fried's emphasis on the photographic operation of 'absorption' has significant implications as the 'vehicle of a [new], essentially "positive" mental or spiritual state, the ultimate implications of which for a history of what in another context has been called "mindedness" have yet to be fathomed' (40).¹⁸ The philosophical stakes of holding onto and capturing certain forms of mindedness as a *necessary condition* of the new photography are indeed high for Fried and are linked to a focused concern with the everyday.

All three meanings of the German term '*aufheben*' are, in effect, used by Fried here: 'to cancel' (the theatrical demands of post-minimalist art), 'to preserve' (an ontology of pictures that stretches back to the evolution of painting in France in the middle of the eighteenth century) and 'to raise' (the philosophical terms associated with the emergence of tableau-format photography).¹⁹ These are, in the end, demanding claims and Fried develops his argument with a now familiar combination of empirical rigour and conceptual ambition. And yet, at the same time one can't help but feel that *Why Photography Matters as Art* remains peculiarly partial in its engagement with the sheer variety of photographic art. The overall effect, I suspect, is, ultimately, one of closure and containment even to the point at which Fried's own recuperation of tableau-photography is itself stretched to a breaking point.

The book's lasting contribution cannot, therefore, be found in its strict commitment to one particular form of contemporary photography, in this case 'wall photography' (as opposed to 'book photography'). Nor is the relationship of that work to a constellation of artistic issues that cluster around an opposition between absorption and theatricality entirely convincing. If there is a decisive significance to Fried's overall argument, it is in the kind of philosophical labour that Fried intuits to be crucial to his interpretation of the photographic tableau. I would go so far as to claim that why photography matters for Fried is in its appeal to the *sharing* of an updated form of absorbed 'mindedness' or what the philosopher Robert Pippin has described as 'living out a certain form of self-understanding' that is itself tantamount to a form of practical engagement or coping

with the world.²⁰ A state of absorption would seem therefore to suggest a 'kind of genuineness' which for Pippin amounts to an ability to recognise in one's actions, one's own agency. Fried's indictment of theatricality both in art and life anatomises, in contrast, a particular sense of failure insofar as some crucial dimension of human sociality has 'gone out of scale or proportion' and such that 'one could not be said any longer to be acting from one's own motivation but merely in a way responsive to the anticipated reactions and demands of others'.²¹ It is ultimately this kind of false responsiveness that Fried understands to be the main wager of minimalist 'objecthood'.

The full significance of this argument is beyond the compass of this review and takes us into issues that are 'connected with the question of modern forms of social dependence and therefore the conditions under which the appeal of an authentic life, one not mediated by the normalizing or conforming, expectation-generating gaze of others [...] would rise to such prominence'.²² 'Mindedness', if we accept Fried's reading would seem to promise much more than a re-thinking of the photographic image in terms that speak to the indexical representation of absorptive states. One way of characterising Fried's effort might be to say that an unstated aim of his book has been to re-think photography as a particular *mode of being*; the crucial question here being the relationship between the photograph and the viewer standing before it.

But can the photographic tableau demand of the viewer a particular kind of active absorption and also acknowledge its status as a mode of address? And, if so, can we perhaps see in this form of beholding not only something specific to photography itself but another kind of artistic response to the 'deteriorating sociality of the common world'?²³

These questions takes us back to the philosophical problem-space shared by Pascal and Wittgenstein which is the problem of reconciling the perspective of artistic practice *with* the perspective of ethics and which I would go so far as to extend to the very exercise of politics itself. In other words, it would be misleading to suggest that *Why Photography Matters* represents a depoliticising shift in the study of advanced photographic practice.²⁴ If anything, the book would profit from being read alongside Jacques Rancière's *The Emancipated Spectator* and T.J. Clark's *Sight of Death*. Setting aside whatever differences exist between the books (and there are of course many), they do share a concern with a politics of looking that returns to the beholder a capacity or potentiality to respond to a picture's stillness and singularity.²⁵ As Fried himself opines quoting Heidegger, the very act of looking is ultimately rooted in a form of 'questioning' (4).

In more practical terms, the kind of questioning that Fried has in mind is explored in ten separate chapters. In Chapter 1, Fried outlines the conceptual terrain of the book highlighting the significance of a thematics of 'absorption' and 'anti-theatricality' for thinking through the appearance of tableau-format photography in the late 1970s. The most interesting passage in the chapter is a section which addresses 'the problematising of beholding in the context of

voyeurism' and 'certain developments in photography and the theory of photography in the 1970s and early 1980s' (30). Drawing on an eclectic array of sources including a passage from Yukio Mishima's *The Temple of Dawn*, Fried goes so far as to radicalise a particular form of 'voyeurism' (29) as somehow internal to the very structures of contemporary photography. 'I suggest,' he writes, 'that once it became imaginable that a "world" could be "contaminated" by the mere fact of being beheld, the situation was ripe for the emergence of an aesthetic that would accept such "contamination" as the basis of its procedures. Inevitably, that aesthetic found its home in photography' (35). According to Fried, a Diderotian version of absorption can, on the one hand, only be secured by the mechanical reproduction of reality specific to the photographic medium (notwithstanding the advent of digitisation). Seeing the 'world' in the 'right perspective' demands, on the other hand, a *particular attentiveness to that world* even if this means for Fried acknowledging the deliberate sense of construction or 'to-be-seenness' – by means of the artist's own sustained absorptive labour – that he understands to be central to the emergence of the photographic tableau.

One can't help but think here that Fried's preoccupation with questions of 'to-be-seenness' owes far too much to his earlier work on minimalism. His argument is most successfully staged in Chapters 2 and 3 which are concerned with works by Jeff Wall and in Chapter 5 which examines Thomas Struth's museum pictures. 'Wall's work,' writes Fried, 'plays a larger role in this book than that of any other photographer' (3). This is hardly surprising given the nature of Wall's 'near-documentary' mode not to mention the dimensions of his working methods which undoubtedly speak to a 'zone of continuity – of shared concerns and resources – between painting and photography' (50). Drawing on Heidegger's concept of worldhood as theorised in *Being and Time* and Wittgenstein's understanding of the everyday, Fried singles out Wall for his ability to work against the grain of photographic indexicality. Wall's artistry is bound up with the deliberate constructedness of his photographs which Fried claims as a 'necessary condition for the successful depiction of world-meaningfulness in contemporary photography' (50). Authentic modes of being-in-the-world are thus secured by *containing* photography's capacity for automatically depicting the world itself read by Fried to reflect a practical but ultimately inauthentic mode of apprehension.

That the social historical dimensions of Wall's work speak to a rather different kind of 'world-deprivation' is never fully adduced. This also applies to readings of Andreas Gursky and Luc Delahaye in Chapter 6 and Thomas Demand in Chapter 8 where it seems impossible in each case to simply bracket the social and the political. Even more puzzling is Chapter 4 in which Fried undertakes a reading of Barthes's *Camera Lucida*. There have been a number of attempts to rethink *Camera Lucida* in recent years and Fried draws particular attention to the text in order to situate it in relation to a 'tradition of antitheatrical critical thought'

(98).²⁶ Crucial to this argument is Barthes's concept of the *punctum* which Fried associates with the 'rejection of different modes of intentionality'.²⁷ For Barthes, the *punctum* denotes whatever a photograph may contain that engages the beholder in a singularly affective manner and that enters into the image regardless of the intent of the photographer. 'This is in keeping,' writes Fried, 'with Diderot's repeated injunction that the beholder be treated as if he were not there' (100).

This very argument runs into difficulties in Chapter 8 where Fried explores the work of the German photographer Thomas Demand. Demand is best known for large format images of three-dimensional life-sized sculptures which he has himself meticulously constructed from paper and which owe their provenance to images selected from the media. Such photographs represent, for Fried, an index of photography's defining indexicality. And yet, if they reference the photographic, they also, following Fried, offer us a 'counter-image of sheer artistic intention'. To Fried, these are pictures that '*represent or indeed allegorize intendedness as such*' (272; original emphasis). To cast Demand's project in such terms is to, however, eschew the very understanding of Barthes's *punctum* explored in Chapter 4. Indeed, Andrew Fisher has it just about right when he writes that the '*punctum* remains limited to the critique of only one layer of intention and loses its metaphysical singularity, Fried's Demand faces one with the bare demonstration of an indexicality that comes after the fact to stand, so to speak, before the fact'²⁸.

Other chapters in the book focus on photographic portraiture (Chapter 7) and objecthood (Chapter 9). In Chapter 9, Fried explores the work of the Bechers' aligning their documentary project with a re-reading of Hegel's notions of 'genuine' and 'spurious' infinity. The Bechers' work comprises a vast photographic archive of typological grids of industrial structures – from water towers and blast furnaces to gas tanks and grain elevators – that they shot in black and white across Europe and America. What interests Fried is the very distinction between the objects photographed by the Bechers over a forty-year period and the literalist objects of minimalist objecthood (Fried distinguishes between 'good' and 'bad' objecthood). This is a dense, difficult, and dazzling chapter which relies heavily on a close examination of Hegel's *Philosophy of Logic*. If I understand Fried correctly, he is at pains to show how the typologies central to the Bechers' work serve to 'remove each object from the spurious infinity of all objects in the world and give them specificity'.²⁹ To do so, as Fried points out is to place each object in an every-expanding system that invites comparison. For Fried, this is always a necessarily indeterminate process and as such an example of what Hegel called a 'genuine infinity'. Only in this way can the objects photographed by the Bechers be said to demonstrate a form of 'good' objecthood. Fried pushes the argument even further. If he explores the *serial* principle at the heart of the Becher's project, his main interest resides in rethinking their typologies as a photographic tableau (in this case, he refers to them as 'typological tableaux' (327)).

This is, in my view, a shaky argument at best though Fried's direct engagement with Hegel in the last main chapter of the book does succeed in bringing to the surface the implicit Hegelian tones underwriting his argument throughout the book. *Why Photography Matters* concludes with a return to the work of Wall and a reading of one of his more recent works, *After 'Spring Snow' by Yukio Mishima* (2000–2005). I have always thought this to be one of Wall's least successful images and one can sense Fried straining to felicitously align the work with the 'double valence of absorption and to-be-seeness' (349). To my mind, these are thematics that remain *internal* to Mishima's remarkable text (a scene from Chapter 34) and Wall's brilliant failure to give these words pictorial form becomes nothing less than an allegory for Fried's own claim on contemporary photography.³⁰ Not only is this a partial account that sidesteps the sheer heterogeneity of photographic practice, but it is one whose lasting contribution is largely philosophical in form and content. That Fried labours *pace* Pascal to find the appropriate critical vantage point from which to adjudicate developments in advanced photographic practice could easily be taken as a solipsistic exercise (and at the expense of the beholder broadly defined). In contrast, I see his book as setting out the precise philosophical stakes that seem to be specific to the medium of photography even if Fried does not fully explore the significance of this. The authors of a recent essay on the philosophy of photography argue that that 'philosophy will need to give a persuasive and coherent account of its foundational intuitions'. In their view, 'paying more attention to artistic uses of photography would give ... [such a philosophy] wider resources for addressing these issues'.³¹ I can't think of a more appropriate place to start than *Why Photography Matters*. It may be a flawed book. It is also a tremendously important one.

Notes

1. Alec Soth interview with Tod Papageorge, <http://alecsothblog.wordpress.com/2007/07/12/papageorge-interview/> [accessed 2 March 2010].
2. Blaise Pascal, *Pensées: Notes on Religion and Other Subjects*, ed. Louis Lafuma, trans. John Warrington (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd: London, 1973), p. 25.
3. Ann T. Delehanty, 'Morality and Method in Pascal's *Pensées*', *Philosophy and Literature*, vol. 28, 2004, pp. 74–88, p. 74.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks, 1914–1916*, ed. G.H. von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell: Oxford, 1961), pp. 83–83e, translation slightly modified by Michael Fried.
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. by Brian McGuinness and David Pears (Routledge: London, 2001 [1921]), p. 88.
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains*, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 7e.
7. Pascal, *Pensées*, p. 22.
8. Louis Marin, *Pascal et Port-Royal* (Presses Universitaires de France: Paris, 1997), p. 18.
9. Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, p. 7e.
10. Michael Fried, *Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before* (Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2008), p. 77; page numbers hereafter cited in text.
11. Michael Fried, *Manet's Modernism* (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1996), p. 402.

12. Robert B. Pippin, 'Authenticity in Painting: Remarks on Michael Fried's Art History', *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 31, 2005, pp. 575–598, p. 578; see also Michael Fried, *Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot* (Chicago, 1980); also see *Courbet and Realism* (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1992); and *Manet's Modernism or the Face of Painting in the 1860s* (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1996).
13. Michael Fried in interview with Jonathan T.D. Neil, <http://www.artreview.com/profiles/blog/show?id=1474022%3ABlogPost%3A633> [accessed 2 March 2010].
14. Andrew Fisher, 'The Involution of Photography', *Radical Philosophy*, vol. 157, 2009, pp. 37–46, p. 40.
15. Andrew Fisher, 'The Involution of Photography', p. 43.
16. Michael Fried, 'James Welling's Lock, 1976', in Sarah Rogers (ed.), *James Welling: Photographs 1974–1999*, exh. cat. (Wexner Centre for the Arts: Columbus, 2000), p. 27; see Fisher, 'The Involution of Photography'.
17. See Diarmuid Costello and Margaret Iversen, 'Introduction: Photography after Conceptual Art', *Art History*, vol. 32, 2009, pp. 825–835, p. 833.
18. Terry Pinkard, *German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002); see Robert B. Pippin, 'Authenticity in Painting'.
19. Pinkard, *German Philosophy 1760–1860: The Legacy of Idealism*, p. 227.
20. Robert B. Pippin, 'Naturalness and Mindedness: Hegel's Compatibilism', *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 7, 1999, pp. 194–212, p. 202.
21. Robert B. Pippin, 'Authenticity in Painting', p. 591.
22. Robert B. Pippin, 'Authenticity in Painting', p. 580.
23. Robert B. Pippin, 'Authenticity in Painting', p. 594.
24. For an alternative view, see Fisher, 'The Involution of Photography'.
25. T.J. Clark, *Sight of Death: An Experiment in Art Writing* (Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2006), p. 121; see also Jacques Rancière, *The Emancipated Spectator*, trans. by Gregory Elliott (Verso: London, 2009).
26. Geoffrey Batchen (ed), *Photography Degree Zero: Reflections on Roland Barthes's Camera Lucida* (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2009).
27. See Andrew Fisher, 'The Involution of Photography', p. 41.
28. Andrew Fisher, 'The Involution of Photography', p. 42.
29. Sarah E. James, 'Subject, Object, Mimesis: The Aesthetic World of the Bechers' Photography', *Art History*, vol. 32, 2009, pp. 874–893, p. 882.
30. This is not to say that photography cannot or should not aspire to a certain literariness but rather that the manner in which this is conferred does indeed matter.
31. Diarmuid Costello and Dawn M. Phillips, 'Automatism, Causality, and Realism: Foundational Problems in the Philosophy of Photography', *Philosophy Compass*, vol. 4, 2008, pp. 1–21, p. 18, p. 15.

doi:10.1093/oxartj/kcq022